Born in 1925 to an affluent family, William F. Buckley, Jr. reached maturity about twenty years after the onset of the Great Depression, which had toppled the Republican Party from power, discredited its economic ideology, and called into question its conservative values. Buckley made it his business in life not to so much rescue these values as to forge a new type of conservatism, but his ability to do the latter depended upon the demise of the former. The pre-Depression values therefore deserve a look, as do the liberal values that replaced them. The following paragraphs necessarily paint in broad strokes, but reflect the consensus of most historians.
Economically the GOP is said during the 1920s to have had a commitment to laissez-faire. This is incorrect. “Laissez-faire” implies that government should not interfere with the free market. But although the GOP used the rhetoric of “laissez-faire,” its policies actively intervened to tilt the market in favor of businessmen over other Americans. Most Americans, however, did not mind. They enjoyed the benefits of the economic boom during the Roaring Twenties, and many embraced the dictum, erroneously attributed to President Calvin Coolidge, that the business of America was business. The boom did indeed generate prosperity: the GDP grew by about 4.2 percent each year, which seemed to confirm another dictum: that a rising tide lifts all boats. (Not quite all boats, to be sure: African Americans did not share in the benefits and farmers suffered from chronic crop over-production, which drove down prices, as well as a disastrous Mississippi River flood in 1927.)
But as usual, Americans lost track of the fact that historically the free market generates cycles of boom and bust; thus, if boom was at hand then bust must inevitably follow. And sure enough, underlying economic forces that gathered during the 1920’s set the conditions for just such a bust. The Stock Market Crash of October 1929 heralded its arrival.
The ensuing Great Depression occurred on the Republican watch. Herbert Hoover was in the White House and Republicans held a comfortable majority in both houses of Congress. The Hoover administration’s economic instinct was to rescue Big Business and impose austerity measures on everyone else. But these policies not failed to effectively counter the Depression, they actually made it worse. In 1932 voters responded in fear and fury by ejecting Hoover from the White House and handing the Democrats control over both houses of Congress, with a 62.5 percent majority in the Senate and an astounding 72.4 percent majority in the House.
FDR took office in March 1933. In the famous “Hundred Days” that followed, Congress gave him every tool he wanted to stem the Depression. And over the next seven years or so, Democrats enacted a slew of laws that may usefully be divided into three types: rescue, recovery, and reform. The latter, collectively known as the New Deal, changed the United States in fundamental ways. They created what historian Carl Degler has called the “guarantor state,” under which the federal government assumed responsibility for providing Americans with a safety net, most notably in the form of Social Security, and for regulating the business and financial sectors in such a way as to prevent a repetition of the Depression. The federal government thus acquired an influence over the American economy not seen since the emergency measures of the Civil War—an influence intended this time to be permanent instead of temporary.
Contrary to popular belief, the New Deal did not end the Depression. World War II did that. In terms of war materials the United States government out-produced Germany, Italy, and Japan combined, by infusing even more government money into the economy than had the massive deficit spending of the 1930s. The night and day manufacture of aircraft, warships, transportation and landing craft, tanks, artillery, ammunition, and thousands of other war materials created full employment, much of it well-paying. Rationing and other wartime economic controls largely prevented Americans from spending this new-found income.
The war’s end in 1945 released this dammed-up wealth, augmented by new government spending to implement the G.I. Bill, a program of generous financial and educational benefits for returning veterans. The economic transition from war to peace was not smooth, but it effectively lifted millions of Americans into the middle class, with enough money to purchase automobiles, new-fangled appliances, and above all, houses.
Democrats viewed the New Deal as a way to rescue American capitalism. Most Republicans initially did not see it that way. In their eyes the New Deal did not rescue capitalism; it introduced socialism. But there was nothing they could do about it. Democrats held both houses of Congress until 1946, when control of Congress abruptly shifted to the Republicans, 53.1 percent in the Senate and 56.7 percent in the House. Even then, Democrat Harry S Truman remained in the White House and went on to gain another term in 1948.
It was thus impossible to erase the guarantor state created by the New Deal, and by 1950 many Republicans questioned whether it was even advisable to try. The GOP divided into two groups: a minority that believed in reversing the most troubling New Deal policies, though not all of them; and a majority that made its peace with the guarantor state, claiming in essence that Republicans could administer the guarantor state better than Democrats. Dwight D. Eisenhower, elected president in 1952, held this belief, and a new political stance emerged that is normally called “modern Republicanism.”
I use “stance” instead of “ideology” because, in their mutual embrace of the New Deal, Republicans and Democrats seemingly shared the basic political ideology undergirding it. Centrism was the political norm, sometimes veering to the left or right but centrist nonetheless. Unabashed conservatism had seemingly been all but driven from American life—permanently, in the eyes of some. In this environment, the outright rejection of the guarantor state and the values that accompanied it seemed at best out of touch and at worst simply crackpot.
But a few political activists dissented from the new order. They sought to promote a distinctively alternate political ideology. No one did more to bring this ideology about than William F. Buckley, Jr.